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1 Introduction
Difﬁcult problems are sometimes solved in a sudden ﬂash of illumination, a phe-
nomenon referred to as “insight.” Recent neuroimaging studies have begun to reveal
the neural correlates of the cognitive processes underlying such insight phenom-
ena (Luo and Niki 2003; Jung-Beeman et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2004a, 2006; Mai
et al. 2004; Lang et al. 2006). However, researchers have encountered a number of
difﬁculties in applying neuroimaging methods to investigate insight. We will out-
line these difﬁculties, deﬁne general criteria brain-imaging studies of insight should
meet, and then discuss in detail to what extent these criteria have been met in recent
attempts to unravel the brain bases of insight.
One main difﬁculty that is well known from behavioral research is to produce
insight phenomena in the laboratory. Even in purely behavioral studies it is hard
to be certain whether participants in laboratory settings actually have insights or
whether they solve problems in a more stepwise manner. A related problem is the
small numbers of problems that are available to study insight (Bowden et al. 2005).
In addition, the well-known classical insight problems, such as the nine-dot prob-
lem (Scheerer 1963), the two string problem (Maier 1930), and the candle problem
(Duncker 1945), greatly vary in their sources of difﬁculty (Kershaw and Ohlsson
2004). This raises the question whether the data obtained in laboratory research can
be generalized. Furthermore, studying how people solve single problems normally
does not produce very reliable data. For this reason, recent experimental paradigms
addressing the brain bases of insight have adopted so-called mini-insight problems
(Bowden et al. 2005). These problems can normally be solved in a short period with
or without external help and many exemplars can be created (Luo and Niki 2003;
Jung-Beeman et al. 2004).
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However, in addition to picking the right tasks, brain-imaging studies of insight
pose a number of other (related) problems. This led us to suggest a number of criteria
that would characterize the ideal experimental paradigm for studying the neural
correlates of insight with functional MRI (fMRI) or EEG (Luo and Knoblich 2007).
We will discuss each of these ﬁve criteria in turn:
(1) Use of problems that elicit restructuring: Although there is debate about how
insight is best characterized, most modern researchers agree with the Gestalt
psychologists’ point of view that insight involves a restructuring of the prob-
lem situation (Duncker 1945; Ko¨hler 1921; Wertheimer 1925, 1959). In order
to solve insight problems one needs to detach oneself from one’s prior expe-
rience with similar problems and to treat the problem in a novel and efﬁcient
way (Davidson 2003; Knoblich et al. 1999; Ohlsson 1992; Weisberg 1995). For
this reason, any study that claims to investigate the neural correlates of insight
should create mental events that essentially contain the feature of restructuring.
(2) Multiple insight events and accurate onset time: The neuroimaging study of
insight requires that multiple insight events can be elicited within a limited
time period. Most event-related fMRI or event-related-potential (ERP) studies
require at least ten to 50 trials in each condition. Although it is possible that
efﬁcient single trial analysis methods will be reliably established in the future,
for now, multiple insight events are a must. A related requirement is that one
needs to be able to precisely time-lock the insight events. In event-related fMRI
or ERP studies, the researcher needs to know exactly the temporal onset of the
critical mental events. One may wonder whether one can avoid this problem
using fMRI studies adopting a block design. However, we believe that these de-
signs are not well suited for the study of insight. The reason is that restructurings
are usually short-lived moments of exceptional thinking that would only make
up a tiny fraction of all mental processes occurring within a block. Thus, it is
likely that brain activations reﬂecting insight will get lost in myriads of other
activations when using block designs.
(3) Hypothesis testing: The ideal experimental paradigm to study insight should
allow one to perform ﬂexible manipulations to test various kinds of research
hypotheses. This includes general hypotheses derived from theories as well as
hypotheses about the precise function of particular brain areas. For example,
during the moment of insight, an old inefﬁcient way of thinking is likely to be
replaced by a new and more efﬁcient way of thinking and this replacement im-
plies cognitive conﬂict. Thus, one could predict that brain areas that mediate
the processing of cognitive conﬂict (e.g., the anterior cingulate cortex, ACC;
Botvinick et al. 2001; Carter et al. 2000; MacDonald et al. 2000) should par-
ticipate in the restructuring. This hypothesis is based on cognitive models of
insight and should hold across different studies of insight, regardless of the par-
ticular problem used. However, in addition to testing general hypotheses, it is
also important to know the exact function of a given region in restructuring. To
determine this function is not as simple as it might seem, because insight is a
holistic process in which people achieve multiple breakthroughs in one single
thought (Kershaw and Ohlsson 2004). A good experimental paradigm for the
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study of insight would be ﬂexible enough to enable a number of manipulations
to test more speciﬁc hypotheses. In the abovementioned example, ACC activa-
tion could be related to different functions, such as conﬂict monitoring (realizing
the contradictions between different ways of thinking), error detection (realiz-
ing that one’s initial thinking was inappropriate), problem success (realizing the
crucial step towards the solution), or general attentive control. The above ex-
amples illustrate that the ideal experimental paradigm for the study of insight
would enable one to conduct precise tests of multiple alternative hypotheses.
(4) Deﬁning reference states: An ideal insight paradigm should enable researchers
to deﬁne suitable reference states. Brain-imaging analysis relies heavily on the
contrast between a target state and a reference state (i.e., the baseline). An ideal
reference state should be comparable with the target state in every aspect except
the one to be examined. Compared with other domains of brain-imaging re-
search, it is relatively difﬁcult to come up with good reference states in studies
of insight problem solving, because insight includes a set of highly integrated
processes that are released in one moment. This makes insight somewhat in-
comparable with other analytical modes of thinking.
(5) Triggers for insight: Finally, the ideal insight paradigm should allow one to
study internally and externally triggered insights. This refers to the fact that
problem solvers can achieve restructurings on their own (internal trigger). Al-
ternatively, restructuring can be triggered by solution hints (external trigger).
Although many behavioral and neuroimaging experiments addressing insight
problem solving are based on the assumption that solution hints trigger similar
processes as internally generated solution attempts (Kershaw and Ohlsson 2004;
Ormerod et al. 2002; Weisberg and Alba 1981; Luo and Niki 2003), one cannot
be sure whether this assumption really holds. Without doubt, the phenomenon
of interest is internally generated insight. Triggering insights externally is just
a way of creating paradigms that make scientiﬁc research on insight tractable.
However, there is a conﬂict between the requirement of ecological validity that
dictates one to investigate internally generated insights and the methodological
requirement of accurate onset times for target events in event-related fMRI and
ERP studies (see point 2). Accurate onset times are more easily obtained for
externally triggered insights than for the internally generated ones. Although
we can ask participants to indicate the time of their insight (e.g., with a but-
ton press), participants’ reports may be delayed. Thus, researchers may have to
come up with some estimate that allows them to go back several hundred mil-
liseconds to anchor the onset time of the internally generated insight and they
can never be sure whether the event timing is correct.
The above list of criteria illustrates that coming up with an adequate experimen-
tal setting to study insight is highly challenging. In fact, we are not aware of any
single brain study of insight that would meet all of these criteria. However, we think
the ﬁve criteria are useful as a benchmark against which brain studies of insight
can be tested. However, each single study will likely have to make compromises.
There is no general rule as where to cut back. This will depend on the particu-
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lar question addressed by a study and the particular methods employed (Luo and
Knoblich 2007).
Before we discuss how recent studies addressing the brain processes underlying
insight meet the abovementioned criterion, we would like to emphasize our belief
that insight can only be understood if we conceptualize it as a cluster of different
processes working together. In our view, insight is not a single process. Rather, it
is a collection of different mental processes. Some of these processes may occur
in many different insight tasks (e.g., detecting that there is a conﬂict). Others may
be less general and may only be needed for particular types of insight tasks. For
instance, perceptual processes may only be involved in tasks where the solution
crucially depends on a spatial restructuring of problem elements.
Thus, studying insight is different from studying basic cognitive processes. Take
episodic memory as an example for such a basic process. We know that a partic-
ular set of brain mechanisms, including the key function of associating or binding
different mental events, subserve the formation and retrieval of episodic memory,
regardless of whether the contents of the memory are words, pictures, voices, or
emotional responses. However, for higher cognitive processes such as thinking and
reasoning, the situation is more complicated. Recent neuroimaging studies reveal
that in seemingly identical syllogistic reasoning tasks, the content-based (concrete)
reasoning and the abstract reasoning (which lacked semantic content) activated dis-
tinct neural networks (Goel et al. 2000).
The diversity of brain processes involved is even larger for insight. Although
restructuring is believed to be the main component of insight, previous research
suggests that there are different types of restructuring. Restructuring can involve a
perceptual reinterpretation of the problem (Ohlsson 1992), directing attention to the
critical problem elements (Knoblich et al. 2001, 2005; Grant and Spivey 2003), a
recombination of elements that gives the problem a new meaning (Bowden et al.
2005; Davidson et al. 1995), or a change in the goal of problem solving (Ohlsson
1992). Therefore, when looking at different paradigms for insight study, we may
not ask if these studies investigate the identical cognitive process or which study is
the only correct one that truly addressed the target topic. Rather, we may keep in
mind that different paradigms may be related to different types of restructuring and
all of them belong to the category of insight, and the correct question we should
ask is which type of restructuring is examined in a given study. In this chapter, we
will discuss four different experimental paradigms that have been used to address
the brain processes underlying insight: The ﬁrst paradigm (Luo and Niki 2003; Mai
et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2004a) used ambiguous riddles and puzzles to study insights
that result from a reinterpretation of meaning. The second paradigm used items from
the Remote Associates Test (RAT) to address how one can create meaningful links
between seemingly unrelated items (Jung-Beeman et al. 2004; Kounios et al. 2006).
The third paradigm addressed perceptual contributions to insight, in particular, the
decomposition of perceptual chunks (Luo et al. 2006). Finally, a fourth paradigm
addressed the question of whether insight occurs in repetitive tasks that provide
opportunities for effective changes in strategy (Haider and Rose 2007; Lang et al.
2006).
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2 Reinterpretation of Meaning in Riddles and Puzzles
One attempt to study the brain bases of insight used riddles and puzzles that can
reliably produce insight-like experiences within a relatively short time. One impor-
tant factor in this approach is to select riddles for which participants understand the
exposition of the problem well but for which they cannot produce a solution. During
scanning, an external trigger (the solution) is provided to catalyze the riddle-solving
process. This allows one to produce insight-like experiences at particular points in
time and to record neural activity correlated with these experiences in particular time
windows. Of course, this implies the troubling assumption that an external solution
hint triggers similar processes as an internally generated insight.
Three types of riddles or puzzles have been used in brain studies on insight so
far. The ﬁrst type were riddles such as “The thing that can move heavy logs, but
cannot move a small nail” (the answer is “river”; Luo and Niki 2003) that require
a solution word in order to resolve a seeming contradiction. The second type were
ambiguous sentences that require a reinterpretation of dominant word meaning in
order to be understood, such as “The haystack was important because the cloth
ripped” that referred to the situation of “parachute jumping” (Mai et al. 2004; Luo
et al. 2004a). The third type were the so-called cerebral gymnastics puzzles such
as “Unfortunately, Smith and his son met a trafﬁc accident; Smith died on the spot
and the boy was badly hurt. They brought the boy to the hospital for he needed an
immediate operation. However, the surgeon saw the son and said: ‘Sorry, I cannot
perform an operation to my own son.’ How could this occur?” (The answer is “The
surgeon is boy’s mother.”) (Luo et al. 2004b).
Solving these riddles or puzzles crucially involved the process of restructuring
because the solutions almost certainly differ from the solver’s initial way of concep-
tualizing the problem. For instance, in the “river” riddle, to come up with the correct
answer “river” one has to ignore object weight that is the focus of the problem de-
scription, and restructure the question in a way that allows a reformulation of the
problem in terms of density of objects. Similarly, in the “parachute jumping” riddle
and the “mother surgeon” puzzle, one has to change one’s initial understanding that
“cloth” refers to something wearable and a “surgeon” must be a man.
There are huge number of such kinds of riddles and puzzles, so it is not difﬁcult
to get sufﬁcient items that are suitable with regard to cognitive components, com-
plexity, length, and other features. However, the riddles and puzzles that create a
need for restructuring are usually difﬁcult. People cannot solve many of these on
their own without external help in a short period. Some items will take the thinker
several seconds to solve, whereas others will take minutes, hours, or even days. So,
it is impossible in a neuroimaging study to simply provide participants with the puz-
zles and to wait for the moment of insight. In order to obtain a sufﬁcient number of
events of insight problem solving in a limited time period one needs to provide so-
lution hints to trigger successful problem solving. The fact that insight phenomena
investigated by the riddle-solving approach are externally triggered is a disadvan-
tage, but the advantage of this approach it that it produces multiple insight events
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with a very accurate onset time. Moreover, using different kinds of reference states,
we can ﬂexibly use this approach to test various hypotheses on insight.
For example, Weisberg (1995) proposed differentiating between superﬁcial and
structural changes in a problem representation. A structural change allows new types
of solution to be proposed or in some ways constrains the solution that can be pro-
posed, whereas a superﬁcial change has neither of those effects. To examine the
neural network involved in the superﬁcial and structural changes, we asked partici-
pants to work on a list of “cerebral gymnastics” puzzles (e.g., the abovementioned
mother surgeon puzzle; Luo et al., unpublished results). For each participant a set of
puzzles was selected so that he/she understood the puzzles very well but could not
solve them. Then, during fMRI scanning, we showed each participant the selected
puzzles, followed by three kinds of hints: restructuring hints that should result in a
deep structural change of problem representation (for the mother surgeon example,
the hint presented is “the surgeon has long hair”); unrelated hints that should induce
superﬁcial changes in the problem representation but should not lead to restructur-
ing (e.g., “the surgeon has blue eyes”); and repetition hints that restated the original
problem description (e.g., “the surgeon was unable to do the operation”).
Participants are likely to obtain the correct solution with the help of repetition
hints, but the unrelated hints and restructuring hints usually do not trigger a correct
solution. In the experimental session, participants were shown three to ﬁve hints af-
ter attempting to solve each puzzle on their own. The hints were presented one by
one in a randomized sequence, and participants were not given any information in
advance on which hint was the real efﬁcient one. This ensured that participants paid
equal attention to each hint. The event-related fMRI results showed that the differ-
ent types of hints led to activation of different neural networks. Most importantly, in
the restructuring hints condition we observed activation in bilateral superior frontal
gyrus (BA 8/6), medial frontal gyrus (BA 8) extending to cingulate cortex, and bi-
lateral posterior middle temporal gyrus, suggesting that this network is involved in
restructuring. In contrast, the more superﬁcial change in the problem representation
induced in the unrelated hints condition was associated with activation in anterior
parts of bilateral superior and middle temporal gyrus (BA 22/21), together with
frontal activation in superior/medial superior frontal gyrus (BA 8) and in left middle
frontal gyrus (BA 9).
Another example for how the riddle-solving approach can be used to test speciﬁc
hypotheses is the investigation on the role of ACC in insight. Although activation
of ACC and of medial prefrontal cortex were consistently observed in brain studies
of insight (Luo and Niki 2003; Mai et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2004a,b, 2006), its exact
function was unclear. Two observations further revealed the dynamic feature of ACC
activation during insight. First, ERP study indicated that ACC activation was present
as early as 380ms after the onset of a restructuring cue (Mai et al. 2004). Given that
it takes around 2,000ms for the participants to fully understand the meaning of
a solution cue, the problems were still not completely solved when ACC became
active. Second, we examined how ACC activation changed across a long session of
solving riddles and found ACC activity decreased as the session progressed (Luo
et al. 2004a). This suggests that ACC becomes functionally less important when
Neural Correlates of Insight Phenomena 259
problem solvers start to develop general strategies to deal with a particular type of
task, even when most tasks require restructuring.
On the basis of these observations, together with the prevalent theory that sug-
gested ACC implements an early warning system (Botvinick et al. 2001) and is
engaged when top-down control fails to block the automatic processing of informa-
tion out of the central processing mechanism, we predicted (1) that the activation of
ACC was insensitive to the difﬁculty of solution/hint understanding and (2) that the
activation of ACC was sensitive to the variation of implicit regularity underlying the
structure of puzzles.
To check whether or not ACC was responsive to the difﬁculty of solution/hint un-
derstanding, we compared the solution cues that were judged by the problem solver
as “understandable, but fairly hard” and those judged as “obvious to understand”
(Luo et al. 2004a). The results showed that ACC was equally involved in both types
of cues. In contrast to ACC, lateral prefrontal cortex was observed to be responsive
to the difﬁculty of processing of the solution cue; this area showed higher activation
when the solution cue was difﬁcult to process. A further ERP study by Qiu et al.
(2006, 2007) compared three kinds of solutions: hints that conﬁrmed participants’
initial correct thinking; hints that led to a successful restructuring that allowed par-
ticipants to solve insight problems they could not solve on their own; and hints that
did not lead to a successful solution of insight problems. The results showed that,
relative to the conﬁrming hint, the other two hints both elicited more negative ERP
deﬂections between 250 and 400ms. The dipole analysis localized the generator
of the difference waves within ACC. This observation implies that the activation of
ACC is unrelated to the ﬁnding of the correct solution. As long as the hint suggests a
new solution path the solvers had not thought about so far, ACC activation increases.
In a further recent study (Luo et al., unpublished results), we compared four types
of solution cues: correct solutions to comprehensible questions (type 1, e.g., “air-
conditioned” to “The ofﬁce was cool because the windows were closed.”); correct
solutions to ambiguous questions (type 2, e.g., “parachute” to “The haystack was
important because the cloth ripped.”), fake solutions to comprehensible questions
(type 3, e.g., “knife” to “The dirty clothes were cleaned, because the rotation had
been done.” – the solution is washing machine); and fake solutions to fake ques-
tions (type 4, e.g., “raining” to “The teacher changed a classroom, because the
surface is round.”). The results of 16 participants showed that, relative to correct
solutions to comprehensible questions (type 1), not only the true solutions to am-
biguous questions (type 2), but also the fake solutions to comprehensible questions
or fake questions (type 3 or type 4) evoked lateral and medial prefrontal cortex acti-
vation (the territory of activation extended into ACC). This result implied that these
areas participated in the processing of an unexpected solution, regardless of whether
the solution ﬁnally turned out to be reasonable or not.
To examine whether or not the activation of ACC was sensitive to the variation
of regularity underlying the structure of puzzles, we compared the neural correlates
of solving two kinds of puzzles (Luo et al. 2004b). In condition A, the subjects
solved a list of puzzles that were constructed by different principles; whereas in
condition B, all of the puzzles were constructed by the same principle. Thus, it was
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possible for the solvers to allocate some task-general strategy to solve the puzzles
in condition B. For condition A, this was relatively difﬁcult to achieve. The results
showed that, relative to the resting baseline, both conditions evoked comparable
activities in the left lateral prefrontal cortex, but that condition A evoked more ACC
activity than condition B. This conﬁrms that ACC is sensitive to the deep structure
of problems, showing stronger activation when this structure is variable, and does
not permit one to develop a top-down strategy.
3 Integrating Meaning in the Remote Associates Test
The RAT approach to investigate the brain basis of insight was developed by
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) and Kounios et al. (2006, 2008). In most studies, par-
ticipants were presented with three words such as french, car, shoe or boot, summer,
ground and were required to generate a solution word that can form a compound
word or two-word phrase with each of the three words (the solution words are horn
and camp in the abovementioned two examples).
According to Bowden et al. (2005), although RAT items are not as complex as
classic insight problems, they exhibit three properties of insight problems:
(1) Solvers are often misdirected in their solution efforts. For example, in the prob-
lem pine, crab, sauce the word pine might direct the initial search of memory
toward items such as pine tree or pine cone rather than pineapple.
(2) Solvers often cannot report how they overcame an impasse (“It just popped into
my head.”).
(3) Solvers sometimes have an “Aha!” experience when they achieve solutions.
Bowden et al. (2005) used the subjective Aha! experience as the deﬁning criterion
for whether an insight had occurred. If an item was solved with the Aha! experience
(“You may not be sure how you came up with the answer, but are relatively conﬁdent
that it is correct without having to check it.”), then this item was classiﬁed as an
insight item; all other items were classiﬁed as noninsight items.
The items were successfully preselected so that the ratio of trials for successful
insight solving and noninsight solving was comparable in most of the participants
(56 vs. 41%), and so were the response times (10.25 vs. 11.28 s) (Jung-Beeman
et al. 2004). An advantage of the RAT approach is that problems can be solved
in a short time without any external help, and that, therefore, it can be used to
investigate internally generated insight. As mentioned earlier, however, it is rela-
tively difﬁcult to determine the onset time of an internally generated insight because
participants’ reports are usually delayed ones and the researcher has to go back sev-
eral hundreds milliseconds to anchor the onset time of the internally generated in-
sight. Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) in their fMRI study chose a point about 2 s prior
to each button press with which participants indicated they had found the solution
as the onset of insight or noninsight events. Their parallel EEG study showed there
was a burst of gamma-band activity associated with the insight solutions (but not
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noninsight solutions) beginning approximately 0.3 s before the button-press solu-
tion response at the anterior right temporal electrodes.
The RAT approach has been used to test the neurological model of insight of
Bowden et al. (2005). This model proposes that insight problem solving originates
from the integration of problem elements that are nondominant for the individual.
The core assumption is that weak semantic activation in the right hemisphere that
is not consciously available is crucial for this integration and for obtaining insights
in general. Using visual-hemiﬁeld presentation and subliminal priming, Bowden
and Jung-Beeman (1998) found that participants showed greater priming effects
(i.e., faster responses to solution target words than to unrelated target words) for
solution words presented to the right hemisphere through the left visual ﬁeld than
to the left hemisphere through the right visual ﬁeld. Consistent with these results,
an fMRI study revealed increased activation in the right anterior superior temporal
gyrus for insight relative to noninsight solving of RAT, and scalp EEG recordings
revealed a sudden burst of high-frequency (gamma-band) neural activity in the same
region just before insight (Jung-Beeman et al. 2004).
4 Altering Meaning Through Perceptual Reorganization: Chunk
Decomposition
Chunk decomposition refers to the decomposition of familiar patterns into their
component elements so that they can be regrouped in another meaningful manner.
Such a regrouping is required in some insight problems because during problem en-
coding problem elements become automatically grouped into familiar chunks. For
instance, it is easy to decompose the loose perceptual chunk that forms the word
“BIT” into its component letters and remove one letter (i.e., the “B”) away to form
the word “IT,” whereas it is much more difﬁcult to transform “BIT” to form the
word “PIT” by removing the lower part of the letter “B.” Knoblich et al. (1999)
proposed that the need to decompose perceptual chunks is an important difﬁculty
source characterizing many insight problems.
In their study, problem solvers were given a false matchsticks arithmetic state-
ment, written using roman numerals (e.g., I, II, and IV), operations (+ and −) and
an equal sign (=) and were required to transform the statement into a true equation
by moving only one stick from one position to another. It was easy for the partici-
pants to transform the equation VI = VII+ I to VII = VI+ I, whereas it was difﬁcult
for them to transform the equation XI = III+ III to VI = III+ III, because the chunk
tightness of “X” is much more higher than that of “VII.” Unfortunately, the match-
sticks arithmetic task is not appropriate for neuroimaging studies, because the task
domain does not provide a large enough variety of problems.
To overcome this problem, we developed a new chunk decomposition task us-
ing Chinese characters as materials (Luo et al. 2006). As a logographic language
system, Chinese characters are ideal examples of perceptual chunks (Perfetti et al.
2005; Tan et al. 2001, 2005a,b; Fu et al. 2002; Siok et al. 2004). Chinese characters
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Fig. 1 Illustration of construction of Chinese character and chunk decomposition task using
Chinese characters. TCD tight chunk decomposition, LCD loose chunk decomposition
are composed of radicals, which in turn are composed of strokes (Fig. 1). Strokes
are the simplest and most basic components of a Chinese character. Usually, strokes
do not carry meaning in themselves. In contrast, radicals convey information about
the meaning and pronunciation of the character. The radicals usually consist of sev-
eral strokes and can be thought of as subchunks of a character. Thus, radicals are
meaningful chunks, whereas strokes are not meaningful in isolation. According to
the chunk decomposition hypothesis it should be much easier to separate a character
by its radicals than to separate a character by its strokes, because particular strokes
are tightly embedded in a perceptual chunk. In other words, the decomposition of
characters into strokes should require a speciﬁc process that breaks the tight bond
among strokes created by the perceptual chunk.
Participants were given tasks that always involved two valid characters, one on
the left side of the display and the other on the right. They were asked remove a
part of the right character and add it to the left character so that two new valid
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characters resulted after the move (Fig. 1). There were two conditions. In the tight
chunk decomposition (TCD) condition, the problem could be solved only if par-
ticipants decomposed the character into separate strokes and moved some of the
resulting strokes from the right to the left character. In the loose chunk decompo-
sition (LCD) condition, it was sufﬁcient to decompose the character into separate
radicals and to move one of the resulting radicals to the left character. Pilot studies
showed that problems requiring the decomposition of a tight chunk were much more
difﬁcult than problems requiring the decomposition of a loose chunk. The former
were often not solved or took several minutes to solve (frequently accompanying
“Aha!” reaction), whereas the latter were usually solved within 2–4 s.
The large differences in problem difﬁculty make it generally difﬁcult to address
the brain processes related to problem solving. Therefore, we provided a hint to cat-
alyze the puzzle-solving process, after the problem solvers had failed to solve the
puzzle by themselves and had got into an impasse state. During the hint stage, the
to-be-moved part of the right-side character was highlighted in red (Fig. 1). This
method enabled us to produce a large enough number of chunk decomposition trials
in the TCD condition. Contrasting the processing of the hint between the TCD con-
dition and the LCD condition (where participants had already solved the problem
on their own and the presentation of the hint just conﬁrmed their previous solution),
we were able to identify the brain areas contributing to chunk decomposition.
Our results showed that the early visual cortex was less active in the TCD con-
dition than in the LCD condition, whereas the higher visual cortex was more active
in the TCD condition. These results suggest the following interpretation. The indi-
vidual features/components contained in a chunk are processed in the early visual
cortex (Uchida et al. 1999). During normal chunk perception, the processing of
these individual features/components will be automatically grouped to form a holis-
tic chunk. However, chunk decomposition requires that these individual chunk fea-
tures be rearranged into a different perceptual chunk. Thus, processing of individual
features is suppressed as reﬂected by the inhibition in early visual cortex, while the
grouping is rearranged as reﬂected by the higher activation in higher visual cortex.
A more general implication of these results is that perceptual processes seem to be
involved in at least some forms of restructuring. In this sense the results seem to
support the Gestalt psychologists’ original claim that restructuring shares similari-
ties with perceptual reinterpretation.
5 Insight and Strategy Change
Research by Haider and Rose (2007) suggests that insight cannot only occur when
people try to solve a particular difﬁcult problem. They claim that restructuring can
also occur when people ﬁnd new strategies to deal with routine problems. In order to
address this hypothesis they use standard implicit learning tasks, such as the serial
reaction time task (Nissen and Bullemer 1987) or the number reduction task (NRT;
Haider and Frensch 2005). Haider and Rose (2007) start with the observation that
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10–70% of the participants are able to verbally describe the deterministic regularity
built into the task when asked to do so in a postexperimental interview. Although
researchers in the ﬁeld of implicit learning are not interested in these participants
and exclude them from further data analyses, Haider and colleagues point out that
the process of spontaneously arising explicit knowledge during an incidental learn-
ing situation strongly resembles the process of ﬁnding the solution for an insight
problem. Accordingly, they used modiﬁed implicit learning tasks as a paradigm to
study insight (Wagner et al. 2004; Lang et al. 2006).
In the standard version of the NRT, participants receive a string of six digits one
by one on a computer screen. The string always consists of the same three digits,
“1,” “4,” and “9” arranged in a different order for each trial (e.g., “9 9 9 1 4 1”). The
participants’ task is to compute the ﬁnal response for the entire string. To do so they
are instructed to process the digit string pairwise from left to right by applying one of
two rules (Fig. 2). The ﬁrst rule states that two identical digits in a pair yield the same
digit (same-rule). The second rule states that the result for two nonidentical digits
is the remaining third digit (different-rule). Participants are explicitly told these two
rules. In the example “9 9 9 1 4 1,” participants ﬁrst receive the ﬁrst two digits
of the digit string “9 9.” These two digits are identical, and therefore comply with
the same-rule, resulting in “9.” After the response “9” has been entered, the third
digit “9” occurs on the screen. Participants compare their response with the new
digit “9.” Again the same-rule generates “9.” Then the fourth digit “1” is presented.
Participants compare their last response “9” with the fourth digit. According to the
different-rule, this comparison yields “4.” The ﬁfth digit “4” again yields “4” (same-
rule) and the sixth digit “1” yields “9” (different-rule). In sum, the stimulus string
“9 9 9 1 4 1” yields the response string “9 9 4 4 9” according to the two rules.
Participants are especially instructed to conﬁrm the last result “9” as the ﬁnal result
of the entire string by pressing the “Enter” key.
Fig. 2 Demonstration of the number reduction task
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In the experiments of Haider and colleagues people calculate the solutions for a
large number of such digit strings and, of course, get faster as they go. In this re-
spect the task is like any other implicit learning task. However, there is one crucial
difference. The response string has a regular structure so that for any given stimulus
sequence, the fourth response is always identical to the third response, and the ﬁfth
response is always identical to the second response. Put differently, participants’ re-
sponses 4 and 5 are a mirror image of responses 2 and 3. However, this regularity
within response strings is neither communicated to participants, nor are they asked
to search for regularity hidden in the task. The results show that participants who
have discovered the task regularity are able to speed up substantially. This big im-
provement results in discontinuities in the learning curve that cannot be explained
by the principle of gradual learning. Some participants start to enter responses 4 and
5 in very quick succession because these can be directly derived from responses 3
and 2, ignoring the stimulus. Others skip responses 3, 4, and 5 altogether because
responses 2 and 5 are always identical.
The sudden change in strategy in this incidental learning situation that goes hand
in hand with explicit knowledge about the regularity in the response structure meets
the condition of restructuring very well. The reason is the strategy change, which
enables the participants to deal with this (tedious) task in an unexpectedly simple
way, brought about when the participants’ initial understanding of the nature of
the cognitive task is fundamentally changed. In addition, participants achieve the
strategy change on their own without any external trigger. Thus, this approach is
appropriate for investigating internally generated restructurings. In contrast to the
previously discussed paradigms that focus on the moment of insight, the implicit
learning approach allows one to more closely look at the genesis of a single “insight”
(strategy change). As a consequence this approach is not appropriate to study which
areas of the brain are active at the moment of insight. However, it enables one to
dynamically track brain activations that prepare a strategy change, that is, the tran-
sition from getting more effective without knowing why to explicitly using more
effective strategies.
6 Conclusion
Although the cognitive processes underlying insight have been studied for many
years (Sternberg and Davidson 1995), the study of the brain basis of insight and
restructuring has only recently begun. In this chapter, we reviewed four types of
experimental approaches that have been used so far. Although the validity of these
experimental designs seems not good enough (yet) to fully demystify the well-
known legends of important discoveries (like Archimedes’s solving of the golden
crown problem or Kekule´’s discovery of the ring structure of benzene), these para-
digms do address different important aspects of insight. Thus, we are conﬁdent that
future brain research will help us to understand why some of our best ideas seem
not to result from hard work but seem to come to us out of the blue.
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